Ripeness Doctrine in NEPA Cases: A Rotten Jurisdictional Barrier by Hust, Bridget A.
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 7
1993
Ripeness Doctrine in NEPA Cases: A Rotten
Jurisdictional Barrier
Bridget A. Hust
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Bridget A. Hust, Ripeness Doctrine in NEPA Cases: A Rotten Jurisdictional Barrier, 11 Law & Ineq. 505 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol11/iss2/7
505
Ripeness Doctrine in NEPA1 Cases: A
Rotten Jurisdictional Barrier
Bridget A. Hust*
"Well," said Owl, "the customary procedure in such cases is as
follows."
"What does Crustimoney Proseedcake mean?" said Pooh.2
Before a court will review a dispute, the issues must be
"ripe,"3 i.e., the controversy must be "reduced to . . . manageable
proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some con-
crete action."4 Traditionally, courts have approached the jurisdic-
tional requirement of ripeness pragmatically and flexibly,
reviewing cases that actually or potentially affect people's rights.5
Environmental disputes, however, are often dismissed be-
cause courts do not consider the issues ripe for review. 6 The juris-
dictional barrier of ripeness has been used to dismiss numerous
environmental cases on summary judgment.7 The reason environ-
mental disputes are not ripe at the time of litigation, or ever, is the
nature of environmental decision-making: many of the decisions
* B.A. in History from Dartmouth College, 1989. J.D. from the University of
Minnesota, 1994. The author wishes to thank the Honorable Donald Lay, Dean
Daniel Farber, and the Hust family.
1. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370
(1988).
2. A.A. MILNE, WINNIE-THE-PooH 48 (New Uniform ed. 1935).
3. A case that is "ripe" is one that has been "brought to a final determination,
and everything seems to have been done which ought to be done before the entry of a
final adjudication on the rights of the parties." 77 C.J.S. Ripe (1952).
4. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n., 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).
5. See, e.g., infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
6. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LrIGATION § 4.08[2] (2d ed. 1992).
7. The other restrictive barrier to environmental litigation is standing. In order
to bring an action, a plaintiff must have "standing," i.e., "sufficient interest in the
outcome of a litigation to warrant consideration of its position by a court." 1A C.J.S.
Actions § 59 (1985). See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n., 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
Environmental disputes concerning the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) and other cases involving review of agency action "customarily" are
decided on summary judgment. Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings at 28 n.14, Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F.
Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992) [hereinafter Brief]. See e.g., Citizens for Envtl. Quality v.
United States, 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989)(Finesilver, C.J) (granting summary
judgement in NEPA case).
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that affect the environment are made, in some significant may, by
the federal government through administrative agencies.8
According to the National Environmental Policy Act of 19699
(NEPA), administrative agencies are required to consider the envi-
ronmental impact of their "recommendation[s] or report[s] on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment."lo Agencies, how-
ever, can avoid this requirement by labelling their actions some-
thing other than "actions or proposals,"11 regardless of whether the
activity at issue will have a real, irreversible effect on the environ-
ment. Through these procedural tactics, agencies can avoid the re-
quirements of NEPA and at the same time subvert the judicial
review guaranteed under NEPA.12
Statutorily, the courts are empowered to force agencies to
comply with NEPA. The Administrative Procedure Act of 194613
8. The federal government has the power to own and regulate land under the
Property Clause: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
In 1990, the federal government's land ownership was estimated to be nearly
662 million acres, just under 30% of the total United States. Almost one-half of the
federal government's land is located in Alaska and the vast majority of the remain-
der is in the West. A significant portion of the land is administered by the Bureau of
Land Management (272 million acres), as well as by the National Park Service, Fish
and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Reclamation. 175 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGE-
MENT, U.S. Department of the Interior, Public Land Statistics, 1990, at 1, 5 (1990).
The Bureau of Land Management also manages 300 million subsurface mineral
acres. BLM Said It Collected Some $50 Million in Bonus Bids in FY-90, INSIDE EN-
ERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Jan. 6, 1992, at 16.
Because of the government's massive landownership, environmental disputes
often arise in the context of a nonprofit legal group challenging a federal administra-
tive agency action affecting the environment. See MANDELKER, supra note 6,
§ 2:03(3). NEPA gives a statutory basis to force review of agency decisions that af-
fect the environment. Timothy A. Vanderver, Jr. et al., National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA), in ENViRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 250 (11th ed. 1991).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988).
10. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
11. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n., 497 U.S. at 890, the Supreme Court
claimed that the Bureau of Land Management's "land withdrawal review program"
was exempt from the NEPA process of considering the environmental impact of the
program, because the program was not an "agency action." Although the BLM had
already completed approximately 1250 individual classification decisions converting
4,500 acres of wilderness into possible mining areas, the Court held that there was
no identifiable agency action. Thus, NEPA was inapplicable. Id. at 885, 890-94.
12. NEPA authorized the creation of The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ). 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1988). The CEQ is the government body that issues regula-
tions pursuant to NEPA. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1992). The CEQ regulations at-
tempt to restrict judicial review until the environmental review process is completed,
that is until a final impact statement has been prepared or until the agency has
determined that no impact statement is necessary or "take[s) action that will result
in irreparable injury." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1992).
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-599 (1988).
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(APA) contains provisions granting courts the authority to review
agency decisions' 4 in order to serve as a "a check against excess of
power and abusive exercise of power in derogation of private
right."I5 While the APA limits the scope of judicial review to "final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy,"' 6 the
Supreme Court has declared that the APA's legislative history sup-
ports the presumption that judicial review covers "a broad spec-
trum of administrative actions." 17 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has also noted that "the Administrative Procedure Act's 'generous
review provisions' must be given a 'hospitable' interpretation."' 8
The judicial system, however, has increasingly narrowed the defini-
tion of "final agency action." In 1990, the Supreme Court declared
that "final agency action" must be in the form of an agency order or
a regulation. The APA, however, does not define "final agency ac-
tion" as such. 19
Because agencies have the power to issue orders and regula-
tions, they also have the power to control when a "final agency ac-
tion" occurs. This gives agencies the power to institute programs
without issuing orders or regulations, thus precluding "final agency
action." Indeed, the move towards less "formal" agency action is
well noted. 20 Through "less" formal procedures, agencies can en-
14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1988). See infra text accompanying note 16.
15. U.S. ArroRNEY GENERAI'S COM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOvERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
76 (1941); See also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977) (stating that the
APA "undoubtedly evinces Congress' intention and understanding that judicial re-
view should be widely available to challenge the actions of federal administrative
officials.")
16. Section 10(c) of the APA reads as follows:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judi-
cial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action
or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of
the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by stat-
ute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this sec-
tion whether or not there has been presented or determined an
application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or,
unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the ac-
tion meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency
authority.
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
17. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967Xcitations omitted).
18. Id. (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955)).
19. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n., 497 U.S. 871, 890-94 n. 2 (1990). Yet,
NEPA does not entail formal decision making processes as envisioned by the APA,
but rather more informal types of decision making. MANDELKER, supra note 6,
§ 1.05.
20. Agencies have moved towards more "notice and comment" rulemaking, which
merely requires agencies to publish rules and allows time for public response. 5
U.S.C. § 555 (1988). This is a much less intrusive process than "on the record"
1993]
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sure that any action they take will be insulated from judicial
review. 21
As a result of the judicial interpretation of "final agency ac-
tion" and the deference courts give to the agencies' labels, many
cases involving environmental issues are deemed not ripe for re-
view. While many cases that are dismissed may truly be "unripe," a
review of the cases reveals that many courts are misapplying the
ripeness doctrine by looking only at the labels agencies give their
actions rather than to the practical effect on the public of such
agency actions.22 In doing so, the courts also fail to consider other
factors that determine when a controversy is "ripe."23
This judicial deference has given agencies license to avoid the
NEPA requirements. 24 Administrative agencies are not consider-
ing the impact of their activities on the environment, 25 even though
they are legally required to do s0.26 When agencies avoid the NEPA
decision making process, they are not just harming the environ-
ment;27 they are harming the public and denying the public's right
to participate in the process.
rulemaking, which requires agencies to publish proposed rules, hold hearings, and
republish rules over a period of several months to several years. 5 U.S.C. § 556-557
(1988). See E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Note, Preserving Review of Undeclared Pro-
grams: A Statutory Redefinition of Final Agency Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643, 644 n.8,
647-49 & n.36 (1991).
21. Yet, judicial review has become the primary means through which NEPA's
environmental decision making responsibilities are enforced. MANDELKER, supra
note 6, § 3.01.
22. See infra discussion Part I & Part II.
23. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-52 (1967) created the test to deter-
mine when a case is ripe for judicial review. The test requires a consideration of: (1)
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the extent of the hardship im-
posed on the parties from withholding judicial review.
24. NEPA requires federal agencies to "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary ap-
proach" to consider the environmental impact of government actions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (1988).
25. In Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1478-83 (W.D. Wash.
1992), the court found that the Forest Service failed to fully examine the impact of a
proposed sale of logging rights in a national forest which is habitat area of the north-
ern spotted owl. Even though the Forest Service had completed a final EIS report,
the court claimed the EIS was too conclusory and did not consider realistic dangers
of the proposed plan. The court quoted Friends of the Earth (FOE) v. Hall, 693 F.
Supp. 904, 937 (W.D. Wash 1988), which claimed: "An agency must candidly disclose
in its EIS the risks posed by its proposed action. Otherwise the EIS cannot serve its
purpose of informing the decision maker and the public before the decision to pro-
ceed is made." For a discussion of the EIS, see infra Part I.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
27. In Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley, 798 F.Supp. at 1478-83, the court held
that because of the Forest Service's failure to comply with NEPA, it had not ade-
quately considered the evidence that their proposed logging project would result in
the extinction of the northern spotted owl. See supra note 25.
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NEPA imposes a duty on agencies to inform and involve the
public in the process.28 Agencies are required to release documents
detailing the basis behind their decisions and, in many cases, hold
public hearings, request public comments, and respond to public
comments.29 If agencies can insure that their projects will never be
"ripe" for litigation or for the NEPA process, they will be allowed to
proceed with many projects and be virtually unaccountable -
either to the public or to other governmental branches. The public
will be denied their legal right to participate in government actions
that may affect their communities. The loss of these participation
and information rights is a legally cognizable injury.30
This article will argue that strictly construing the ripeness
doctrine in environmental cases defies precedent and the intent of
the APA and NEPA. Federal agencies were not meant to govern
without accountability. NEPA was drafted to provide accountabil-
ity; avoiding its requirements injures not only peoples' rights but
also may damage the environment. Part I of this article will pro-
vide the background of judicial review of the agency decision-mak-
ing process in the environmental area. Part II compares two recent
cases. Part III will document the reasons that favor analyzing
these problems flexibly.
Part I: Background
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196931 (NEPA) pro-
claims that it is the policy of the federal government "'to use all
practicable means' to protect environmental values." 32 Congress
directed that "the policies, regulations, and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 1503(4) (1992).
29. Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. at 1478-83; 40 C.F.R. § 1503
(1992).
30. City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 492
(D.C. Cir. 1990)("The procedural and informational thrust of NEPA gives rise to a
cognizable injury from denial of its explanatory process, so long as there is a reason-
able risk that environmental harm may occur."); Competitive Enterprise Inst. v.
NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1990)("NEPA creates a right to information on
the environmental effects of government actions.., any infringement of that right
constitutes a constitutionally cognizable injury, without further inquiry into causa-
tion or redressibility.").
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (1988).
32. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). NEPA states that such means must be "consistent with other
essential considerations of national policy." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1988). Specifically,
NEPA requires agencies "to use all practicable means ... to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may
fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for suc-
ceeding generations." Id. § 4331(b)(1).
1993]
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with [the environmental values furthered by NEPA." 33 To achieve
that policy, NEPA requires federal agencies 34 to follow several
procedures.
Initially, agencies are required to complete an "environmental
assessment," which is a brief document analyzing whether a pro-
posed agency action will have an environmental impact.35 The en-
vironmental assessment must describe the environmental impact of
the proposed action and any alternatives to the proposed action.3 6
If the agency determines that the proposed action will not have a
significant impact on the environment, the agency must file and
make public a "finding of no significant impact."37 If the agency
decides that the proposed action will have a significant impact on
the human environment, the agency must complete an "Environ-
mental Impact Statement" (EIS). The EIS38 is a comprehensive ex-
amination of the proposed action. It must "provide full and fair
discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform
decision-makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives
which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the
quality of the human environment."39
As originally drafted, NEPA was vague on exactly when agen-
cies had to complete an EIS. NEPA states that agencies must pre-
pare a "detailed statement 40 for "every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment."41 The
33. Id. § 4332(1).
34. The regulations define "federal agency" as including all agencies of the fed-
eral government, plus States, other units of general local government, and Indian
tribes assuming NEPA responsibilities under section 104(h) of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974. The definition of "federal agency" does not
include "the Congress, the Judiciary or the President, including the performance of
staff functions for the President in his Executive Office." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.12 (1992).
35. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1508.9 (1992).
36. 40 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C), (2E) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1992).
37. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.13 (1992).
38. The most important part of an EIS is the section that describes the alterna-
tives to the proposed action and compares the alternatives to the main proposal. 40
C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1992). This section, which the regulations call the "heart" of the
EIS, "sharply defin[es] the issues and provid[es] a clear basis for choice among op-
tions by the decisionmaker and the public." Id. § 1502.14. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1988) and 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (1992) for the regulations which cover the EIS.
39. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1992). The actual EIS process entails a draft, EIS, a com-
ment period, and a final EIS. Id. §§ 1503.2, 1503.4.
40. The "detailed statement" must be completed by "the responsible official." 40
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
41. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C) (1988). It should be noted that there have been only a
few, explicit exclusions from NEPA, such as the Alaskan oil pipeline and the San
Antonio Freeway. ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRoNMENTAL LAW,
105 n.k. (1991) [hereinafter FINnLEY & FARBER]. In addition, many EPA actions are
exempt from NEPA requirements. Id. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
510 [Vol. 11:505
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Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations clarify the
definitions of the terms "proposal" and "major federal action."42
The regulations define "proposal" as follows:
"Proposal" exists at that stage in the development of an action
when an agency subject to the Act has a goal and is actively
preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative means
of accomplishing that goal and the effects can be meaningfully
evaluated. Preparation of an environmental impact statement
on a proposal should be timed ([40 C.F.R.] § 1502.5) so that the
final statement may be completed in time for the statement to
be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal.
A proposal may exist in fact as well as by agency declaration
that one exists. 4 3
Although this definition appears to be quite flexible, implying that
an EIS should be completed prior to the time when an agency
makes a recommendation or report on a proposed action, the
Supreme Court has strictly construed this requirement. In Kieppe
v. Sierra Club,44 the Court held that courts may only force agencies
to complete an EIS at the time of proposal and that the EIS need
only cover the exact agency proposal as the agency has labelled it,
not the proposal in fact.45 Despite this decision, courts of appeal
have continued to refer to the CEQ regulations.46
As to when agency actions constitute "major" federal actions,
the courts generally determine this issue on a case-by-case basis.47
§ 1371(c)(1988); The Federal Energy Administration Act of 1977 (1974), 15 U.S.C.
§ 793(c)(1) (1988) (exempting the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1988)).
42. 40 C.F.R §§ 1508.23, 1508.18 (1992).
43. Id. § 1508.23 (emphasis added).
44. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). In Kleppe, the petitioners claimed that the federal gov-
ernment failed to comply with NEPA, because it did not complete an EIS for a pro-
posed mine leasing program. Id. at 395. While the government completed
individual EIS reports for each lease, it did not complete one for an area covering
four states. Id. at 396-400. The petitioners claimed that the mining program would
involve interrelated environmental effects and that a single EIS was necessary for
the entire four state region. Id. at 408. Because the Court claimed that there was
"no evidence in the record of an action or a proposal for an action of regional scope,"
an EIS for the region was not necessary. Id. at 400, 414-15.
45. Id. at 408-415. When interpreting the term "proposal," the Court was very
mechanical and unhelpful. The Court assumed that the "presence or absence of a
'proposal' is self evident. FimDLEY AND FARBER, supra note 41, at 136. It has been
noted that in dealing with this issue, the Court was "overly deferential to [the]
agency decision and ignored the overriding policies of NEPA. Id.
46. Id. at 137.
47. Although the CEQ regulations do not specifically define "major federal ac-
tion," the regulations do state that federal actions tend to fall within one of the fol-
lowing categories: (1) the adoption of official policy, such as rules and regulations, (2)
the "adoption of formal plans... which guide or prescribe alternative uses of federal
resources, upon which future agency actions will be based," (3) the adoption of pro-
grams, systematic and connected agency actions which implement a specific statu-
tory program or executive directive, and (4) the approval of specific projects, such as
construction, management activities located in a defined geographic area, and ac-
1993]
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Although the definition of "major" is difficult, the cases generally
focus on the "magnitude and size of the action as an indicator of its
potential impact on the quality of the human environment."48
Whether an action is "major" is ultimately related to whether it
"significantly"49 affects the human environment, and indeed, many
courts examine these two questions together. 50 Other factors which
courts may consider to determine whether an agency action is "ma-
jor" are: the environmental impact; the economic magnitude of the
project; and the extent of government resources, planning, time,
and expenditures. 5 1
NEPA requires the federal government to examine the effect
any "major federal action" or legislation will have on the environ-
ment, but it does not require the federal government to take sub-
stantive actions to protect the environment. 52 Yet, as Judge Skelly
Wright proclaimed in 1971, NEPA establishes a strict standard of
compliance:
NEPA mandates a particular sort of careful and informed deci-
sionmaking process and creates judicially enforceable duties.
S. . [Ihf the [agency] decision was reached procedurally without
individualized consideration and balancing of environmental
tions approved by permits or other regulatory decisions as well as federal and feder-
ally assisted activities. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1992), MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 8.04.
The following projects have been held to be "major": a $14 million bridge with 60%
federal funding, Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693
(2d Cir. 1972); the conversion of a large federally subsidized housing project, Jones v.
United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 390 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. La. 1974);
and a $1.5 million dollar water channel project that used $706,000 of federal fund-
ing, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (D. NC.
1972).
The following projects have been held to be not "major": a replacement bridge,
Sierra Club v. Hassel, 636 F.2d 1095 (D. Cal 1981); the demolition of a historic build-
ing to which $25,000 of federal money was committed, Committee to Save Fox Bldg.
v. Birmingham Branch of Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 497 F. Supp. 504 (D. Ala.
1980); and minor traffic improvements, Julis v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 349 F.
Supp. 88 (D. Iowa 1972). For more examples, see MANDELER, supra note 6,
§ 8.06[3].
48. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 8.06[3]. The regulations define "human environ-
ment" as referring "comprehensively to include the natural and physical environ-
ment and the relationship of people with that environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14
(1992). An EIS will not be prepared solely to examine the economic and social effects
of an agency action. If, however, an EIS is required and the economic and social
effects of an agency action are interrelated to the natural and physical effects of
agency action, the EIS will consider the economic and social effects. Id.
49. "Significantly" refers to the extent of the effect of the agency action on a par-
ticular locale. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1992).
50. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 8.06[3].
51. Id.
52. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
(noting that although the preparation of an EIS will probably affect an agency's deci-
sion, NEPA does not mandate particular results.)
[Vol. 11:505
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factors-conducted fully and in good faith-it is the responsibil-
ity of the courts to reverse. 53
The rational of NEPA is that if the federal government incorporates
into its procedures an examination of environmental concerns, the
environment will be, in fact, protected substantively.54
Integral to the NEPA process is public involvement in the
agency decision-making process.5 5 The CEQ regulations specifi-
cally require that agencies "make diligent efforts to involve the pub-
lic in preparing and implementing NEPA procedures."56 Agencies
are required to provide public notice of meetings or hearings related
to agency action, inform affected persons of agency action, solicit
appropriate information from the public, and explain to the public
where information concerning the agency action can be obtained.57
Agencies are required to hold public hearings or meetings if there is
a "substantial environmental controversy concerning the proposed
action or substantial interest in holding the hearing" or when an-
othei- agency requests a hearing or meeting.58 If courts allow agen-
cies to preempt the NEPA process by denying judicial review,
53. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
54. Id. at 1111-15; Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 368 (D.
Colo. 1992).
Section 102(2)(A) of NEPA provides:
[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall utilize a systematic, in-
terdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the
natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in plan-
ning and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's
environment.
MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 6.02.
Section 102(2)(B) of NEPA states:
All agencies of the Federal Government shall identify and develop
methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environ-
mental Quality... which will insure that presently unquantified envi-
ronmental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in decision-making along with economic and technical
considerations.
MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 6.03.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 4369(b) (1988).
56. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (1992).
57. Id.
58. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1506.6(cXl) & (2) (1992). In Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II),
471 F.2d 823, 836 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 908 (1973), the court held
that the agency "must give notice to the public of the proposed major federal action
and an opportunity to submit relevant facts." Although the court claimed that a
"full-fledged formal hearing" was not required, the court stated that, based on NEPA
§ 102(2)(B), a hearing of some sort was advisable to hear community concerns
"where emotions are likely to be aroused by fears, or rumors of misinformation." Id.
at 835-36.
While some courts have followed the Hanly I holding, others have explicitly
stated that no hearing or other opportunity for public participation is required by
NEPA. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 7.04[7][b]. However, the plain language of
NEPA and the CEQ regulations supports strong public involvement:
1993]
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NEPA's purpose of involving the public in government actions is
eviscerated.
The NEPA process informs the public of agencies' decisions
and analyses documented in the EIS.59 The EIS assures the public
that the agencies did consider the environmental impact and pro-
vides the public with the basis and analysis of government deci-
sions.6 0 Moreover, if an EIS is faulty, for example, if mining values
of land are assessed higher than the actual fair market value or if
the recreational value of land is not properly assessed, public par-
ticipation can correct the faulty information.61
In addition, the process provides an opportunity for the public
to communicate directly with Congress. 6 2 The NEPA regulations
NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information is avail-
able to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before
actions are taken. The information must be of high quality. Accurate
scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are es-
sential to implementing NEPA.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b)(1992) (emphasis added). See also id. § 1506 (public
involvement).
59. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19(c) (1992) provides that agencies must furnish the entire
impact statement to "[any person, organization or agency" who requests the entire
environmental impact statement.
60. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)(stat-
ing publication of an EIS, "both in draft and final form, also serves a larger informa-
tional role. It gives the public the assurance that the agency 'has indeed considered
environmental concerns in its decision-making process,' Baltimore Gas & Electric
Co. 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1982), and perhaps more significantly, provides a springboard
for public comment.")
61. The regulations provide that after preparing a draft EIS, but before issuing a
final EIS, agencies are required to request comments from the public, particularly
soliciting comments "from those persons or organizations who may be interested or
affected." 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(4) (1992).
For example in their brief for Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp.
364 (1992), the plaintiffs claimed that they would have corrected certain
information:
The preparation of a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
would also provide the Coalition and its members with an opportunity
to prepare written comments and participate in public hearings on the
reliability and accuracy of the [Secretary of Interior's mineral dollar-
assessment]... Specifically, the Coalition would argue that the estima-
tion of the value of minerals in the Red Cloud Peak and Handles Peak
wilderness study areas has been drastically over-estimated. Further-
more, the United States Geological Survey, in preparing the dollar-as-
sessment, failed to consider the economic costs of extracting the
minerals. The Coalition would like to take advantage of the opportu-
nity available to it under the National Environmental Policy Act to
have its comments incorporated into a Draft Supplemental Environ-
mental Impact Statement and to have the Interior Department respond
to those comments in the Final Supplemental Impact Statement.
Brief, supra note 7 (declaration of Rocky Smith 4-5).
62. The regulations state that:
[t]he primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve
as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined
in the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Fed-
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direct agencies to solicit comments from the public.63 Those com-
ments are incorporated into the final EIS report.6 4 Federal officials
are required to use the EIS "to plan action and make decisions."65
Without the preparation of an EIS, the public is frustrated in com-
municating its wishes to Congress, thus not only curtailing public
participation in the legislative process but also preventing the pub-
lic from challenging agencies' decisions.66 If the public is excluded
from this process, the public may suffer a substantive legal
wrong.67 Finally, and most importantly, the EIS process provides
Congress with the most accurate information possible through a
"cross-pollinization of views,"68 so Congress can legislate under the
best circumstances, considering the full environmental impact of
any agency decision.
Although NEPA allows for the preparation of the EIS and for
public participation in the legislative process, NEPA itself does not
eral Government. It shall provide full and fair discussion of significant
environmental impacts and shall inform decision-makers and the pub-
lic of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize ad-
verse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment.
Agencies shall focus on significant environmental issues and alterna-
tives... An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure
document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with
other relevant material to plan action and make decisions.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1992).
63. Id. §§ 1503.1(4), 1506.6 (1992).
64. Id. § 1503.4.
65. Id. § 1502.1.
66. For example, a declarant for the plaintiffs in Colorado Entl. Coalition v.
Lujan stated:
Secretary Lujan's failure to prepare a Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement also has frustrated the Coalition's ability to partici-
pate in the legislative process. The official NEPA comment and hearing
procedure is an important means that the Coalition uses to communi-
cate with Congress regarding the wilderness designation process. By
not preparing a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and
thus foreclosing formal comment through the NEPA process, Secretary
Lujan has cut off an important form of communication with Congress.
Without a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and the de-
tailed information concerning the methodology and reasoning support-
ing the dollar-value assessment that a Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement would provide, the Coalition is hampered in rebut-
ting Secretary Lujan's decision and in participating effectively in the
legislative process.
Brief, supra note 7, Declaration of Rocky Smith.
67. Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 368, (D. Colo. 1992)
("some classes of procedural duties are so enmeshed with the prevention of a sub-
stantive, concrete harm that a plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a sufficient like-
lihood of injury just through the breach of that procedural duty" (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, -U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2160) (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing)). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
68. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1094 (10th Cir. 1988) (outlining the
number of avenues for public involvement in the NEPA process including notifica-
tion and consultation of agency actions and reports).
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create a private right of action to challenge the inadequacy of an
EIS.69 Suits must be brought through section 10(c) of the APA,70
allowing for judicial review of agency decisions. When the APA is
used to bring a NEPA case, judicial review is only allowed when the
issues are "ripe."
The standard of review of NEPA cases is not entirely clear. In
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,71 the Supreme Court
held that an "arbitrary and capricious" standard applies to judicial
review of an agency's decision not to prepare a Supplemental EIS.72
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard allows courts to be very
deferential to agency determinations. 73 It is unclear, however,
whether the Marsh holding will be expanded to apply to all future
NEPA cases, as Marsh was a very special situation. The plaintiffs
in Marsh were requesting a Supplemental EIS.74 NEPA, itself,
does not require an agency to prepare a Supplemental EIS, but the
CEQ regulations do require a Supplemental EIS whenever there is
significant new information relating to the environmental impact of
the proposed action or whenever the "agency makes substantial
change in the proposed action."75 Because NEPA does not specifi-
cally require a Supplemental EIS, it is unclear whether Marsh will
be followed in all NEPA cases.7 6
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 77 the Supreme
Court held that courts must use a "clear error of judgment" stan-
dard when reviewing the agency's findings of fact. 78 This standard
is complementary to the "arbitrary and capricious standard. 79
69. The federal courts have held, nevertheless, that judicial review is implied in
NEPA. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 3.01; Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., 449
F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(stating "NEPA... creates judicially enforceable
duties.") Also, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the
United States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 298-300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
931 (1973) suggested substantive review is based on "common law."
70. The Supreme Court held in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1977)
that the APA is not an independent source of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in NEPA
cases is usually asserted under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
71. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
72. Id. at 375-76.
73. See MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 8.02[4][a].
74. 490 U.S. at 368.
75. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (1992).
76. Already, in Goos v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 911 F.2d 1283, 1292 (8th
Cir. 1990), an Eighth Circuit opinion applied the "reasonable" standard of review in
effect prior to Marsh. The Goos court distinguished Marsh and claimed it did not
control. Id.
77. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
78. Id. at 416.
79. Id. The Supreme Court held that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is
the same as "clear error of judgment" standard in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
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Many courts have cited the "hard look" doctrine when review-
ing NEPA cases.80 Although the doctrine is difficult to define, it
requires the court to investigate whether the agency took a "hard
look" at the environmental impact of the proposed action.8 ' In es-
sence, whatever the terminology the standard of review for NEPA
cases is very high.82
When determining if a particular case is ready for judicial re-
view under the APA, courts focus on whether the agency has made
a definitive determination which has a permanent effect on a
party's rights or obligations.83 The seminal case that outlined the
test to determine whether a case is ripe is Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner.8 4 The plaintiff, Abbott Laboratories, was part of a group
of drug manufacturers that brought action seeking an injunction
against regulations that the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare and the Commissioner of Food and Drugs had promul-
gated. The regulations required that labels, advertisements, and
other printed material prominently display the "established name"
of a drug, i.e., the name of the drug designated by the Secretary of
the Health, Education, and Welfare,85 along with the proprietary
trade name of the prescription drug every time the trade name was
80. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 3.04[4].
81. See Public Citizen v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 848
F.2d 256, 266-67 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(discussing the extent of the "hard look" it demands
of agencies). See also MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 3.04[4] for a discussion of the
"hard look" doctrine.
82. While the judicial review standard currently may be high, one commentator
stated:
Experience with NEPA may justify a more rigorous judicial review
standard. The Council on Environmental Quality regularly reports
that the number of cases in which federal agencies decide not to pre-
pare impact statements vastly exceeds the number of impact state-
ments which are prepared.
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAw AND LITIGATION § 8.02 (1984 & 1990 Supp.) The
Council on Environmental Quality's report entitled Environmental Quality 1980:
11th Annual Report on the Council on Environmental Quality 384 (1980), stated
that in 1979 approximately 1400 EIS reports were prepared, but federal agencies
also prepared thousands of environmental assessments that concluded that no EIS
was required. This trend may have only deteriorated. In 1987, federal agencies pre-
pared only a third as many EIS reports as were prepared in 1977. FINDLEY & FAR-
BER, supra note 41, at 164.
83. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967).
84. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Drug companies sued the Secretary of Health and Edu-
cation to challenge a regulation which required labels, advertisements, and other
printed matter to reveal the 'established' name of a drug every time the trade name
was used. Id. at 137-39. The regulations were held to be null and void by the Dis-
trict Court. Id. at 139. The Third Circuit reversed. Id. The Supreme Court held
that the issues were ripe for review, and remanded the case. Id. at 148-57.
85. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare designates an "established
name" to a prescription drug pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
of 1962, 21 U.S.C. § 352(e)(2)(1988).
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used.8 6 Because the regulations required drug companies to spend
considerable amounts of money changing labels and promotional
material, the Court considered the action brought by the drug com-
panies "ripe," even though the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare had not yet enforced the regulations.8 7 The Court out-
lined a "ripeness test" which has evolved into the following:
(1) whether the issue[s are] fit for judicial resolution, consider-
ing whether they [are] purely legal and whether the agency ac-
tion was final; and (2) the extent of hardship to the parties of
withholding judicial review, considering the direct impact on
the day-to-day activities of the parties challenging the agency
action.8 8
The first prong of the Abbott Laboratories test centers on
whether a court can pass judgment on a solidified issue. Courts are
much less deferential when reviewing agencies' legal positions than
when reviewing agencies' findings of fact.89 A court may consider
whether an agency action is at all legal. Thus, a court considers
whether there are only legal questions at issue rather than factual
questions.90 For example, a court will examine closely an agency
decision not to complete an EIS for a proposed action but will be
more deferential when determining whether an agency complied
properly and adequately with NEPA.91 The courts, however, tend
to require a factual situation to test whether there is only a legal
question in order to flesh out a dilemma into "manageable propor-
tions . . . by some concrete action."9 2
86. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 138. The purpose of the regulation was
to make the public aware that many drugs sold under trade names are available
under "established names" at significantly lower prices. Id.
87. Id. at 148-156.
88. Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 369 (D.Colo 1992)(cit-
ing Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1415 (10th Cir. 1990))..
89. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 3.04[2].
90. The courts are more likely to reverse or modify agency decisions in NEPA
cases when the issues are a combination of legal and factual issues rather than only
factual issues. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 1.05.
91. Id.
92. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990). For example, in
Lujan, the Court stated that:
the individual actions of the [Bureau of Land Management] identified
•.. can be regarded as rules of general applicability (a "rule" is defined
in the APA as agency action of "general or particular applicability and
future effect," 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)(emphasis added [by Court])) announc-
ing, with respect to vast expanses of territory that they cover, the
agency's intent to grant requisite permission for certain activities, to
decline to interfere with other activities and to take other particular
action if requested. It may well be, then, that even those individual
actions will not be ripe for challenge until some further agency action or
inaction more immediately harming the plaintiff occurs. But it is at
least entirely certain that the flaws in the entire "program" - consist-
ing principally of the many individual actions referenced in the com-
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Part of the consideration of whether there is some concrete ac-
tion that a court can review is determining the "final agency action"
at issue.93 Final agency action is a jurisdictional requirement, i.e.,
the court must be satisfied that there has been final agency action
before it can proceed to review a case on the merits. Finality is "an
essential precondition to ripeness."94 This is a practical determina-
tion 95 and, in NEPA cases, finality is a "severable procedural is-
sue," meaning that a court can review whether there has been some
"final agency action" that has violated NEPA, even though under
existing law, the agency action itself could not be reviewed until a
later action.96 Yet, "final agency action" is not defined in the APA,
and courts have struggled since the passage of the APA in 1946 to
define "final agency action."97
plaint, and presumably action yet to be taken as well - cannot be laid
before the courts for wholesale correction under the APA, simply be-
cause one of them that is ripe for review adversely affects one of the
respondent's members.
Id. at 892-93.
93. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 148-49. E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, supra
note 20, at 646-47 n.31 ("While courts assess ripeness... to determine whether a
case meets either prudential or Article III 'case or controversy' requirements, finality
is a jurisdictional requirement that a litigant must meet to state a claim under § 10
of the APA.) See Eagle Picher Ind. v. United States EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915
(1988)("Ripeness law overlaps at its borders with Article III requirements of case or
controversy.").
94. E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, supra note 20, at 647 n.31.
95. In Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area Coalition v. NYC Dept. of Envtl.
Protection, 697 F. Supp. 666, 674-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the court held that HUD's ac-
tion of giving preliminary approval to a housing project was final, even though no
final decision had been made:
There is certainly merit to the municipal defendant's argument that
HUD's act in this case is not final, and therefore not reviewable, until
all steps in the application process... have been completed. However,
although that may be the point at which HUD views its action final,
'the label an agency attaches to its action is not determinative,' Conti-
nental Air Lines v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc)
... the finality requirement is interpreted in a 'flexible' fashion. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 149-50.
In Town of Rye, NY v. Skinner, 907 F.2d 23, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S.Ct. 673 (1991), the court held that the FAA's action of approving an airport project
was ripe for review (even though the funding for the airport project was uncertain),
because no further action was required to evaluate the environmental impact of the
project.
96. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (Scrap II), 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975)("When agency or departmental considera-
tion of environmental factors in connection with [a] 'federal action' is complete,
notions of finality... do not stand in the way of judicial review of the adequacy of
such consideration, even though other aspects of the [agency action] are not ripe for
review.")
97. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
held that an agency's refusal to prepare an EIS is not a final agency action for the
purposes of APA review, yet Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364,
369 (D. Colo. 1992) held an agency's refusal to prepare a Supplemental EIS is "final
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To further complicate matters, the only time "final agency ac-
tion" is an issue is when the agency claims that its own determina-
tion is inconclusive. 9S In such a situation, a court must make a
practical determination balancing the agency's desire to complete
its decision-making process without interference against the possi-
bility that withholding review will ultimately preclude a remedy for
a plaintiffs potential injury.99 A plaintiff could be denied a remedy
if the agency proceeds with some activity that irreparably harms
the plaintiff or the environment. To avoid such an undesirable re-
sult, courts generally "resolve the finality question by focusing on
whether an agency has made a 'definitive' determination that has a
conclusive effect on a party's rights or obligations." 100
Once a court has decided whether the issues in a case are legal
and whether there has been final agency action, the court then con-
siders the second prong of the Abbott Laboratories test - the effect
on the plaintiffs of withholding review. There have been cases
where the circumstances are such that withholding review would
have an irreversible environmental effect and would impose a great
hardship on the plaintiffs. 10 1 In such a case, the court may decide
agency action." Furthermore, the decision not to file an EIS is known as a "thresh-
old" question under NEPA, which is judicially reviewable. MANDELKER, supra note
6, § 3.02.
The CEQ's regulations state that it is the Council's "intention" that judicial re-
view of agency decisions take place only after an agency has either filed an EIS or
has made a final finding of no significant impact or takes "action that will result in
irreparable injury." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1992). The regulations also state that there
should be no cause of action for "any trivial violation of [the CEQ's] regulations." Id.
98. In Blue Ocean Preservation Soc. v. Watking, 754 F. Supp. 1450, 1460-88 (D.
Haw. 1991), the Department of Energy planned a four phase project to encourage the
development of geothermal energy. The Department of Energy claimed that the liti-
gation was not ripe because they had not entered into certain contracts. The court
held, however, that the action was ripe, because Congress had already funded a ma-
jor portion of the project and much of the project was already constructed and opera-
tional. The court stated "To rule that a proposal on which Congress had already
acted is not ripe for NEPA purposes, i.e., does not trigger NEPA obligations, would
elevate form over substance." Id. at 1462. Cf Public Citizen v. U.S. Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n., 940 F.2d 679, 681 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1991) where the court held that there
was no final agency action, even though the agency conceded finality. The court
claimed that finality is a judicial question and the agency had no power to concede
the issue. Id.
99. Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (W.D. Wash
1992)("To postpone judicial review until specific timber sales were designed and
about to be auctioned would defeat the interests of not only the plaintiffs but also the
agency and loggers as well.").
100. E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, supra note 20, at 644.
101. See Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1481-83 (W.D.
Wash. 1992)(detailing evidence that if the Forest Service was allowed to continue
with its timber harvesting program, the northern spotted owl would become extinct).
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1980), the
Corps of Engineers recommended, on the basis of a report, an "early action" water
supply project, which would drain water from the Hudson River. Id. at 240. The
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to consider the merits of a case, even if it is obvious that the agency
has not completed its decision-making process.1 0 2 If an agency will
take years to resolve an issue, a court may deem the issues ripe in
order to avoid permanent damage.,0 3
The Abbott Laboratories test, although easily stated, has been
applied in various ways and has been a source of major confusion.
Indeed, "the categorization of a case as unripe for federal adjudica-
tion cannot be reduced to an orderly, much less a highly principled
and predictable, process." 1o 4 The ripeness doctrine boils down to
whether a court can "intelligently" decide an issue "in the
abstract."lO5
Traditionally, the Abbott Laboratories test has been applied in
a pragmatic, flexible and functional manner.' 0 6 Yet, recently the
Supreme Court has favored a much more formalistic approach to
ripeness questions.lO7 In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation 108
Corps did not intend to issue a final EIS until the three to five year study of the
project was completed. Id. The Second Circuit held that the Corps' Report was not
"final agency action." Id. at 241. The dissenting judge urged that an interim action
should be considered "final agency action," because he believed that alternatives to
the project would not be considered, and that made the action final. Id. at 242-47.
The dissenting judge criticized the majority's holding:
An astute agency, I fear, would take great advantage of such a rule, by
deferring formal decision on a project until the last possible moment,
even though it fully planned to build the project.
Id. at 247 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
102. MANDRLKER, supra note 6, § 4.08[2] ("A holding that an agency action is not
ripe for review until a final project or permit decision is made may unnecessarily
delay judicial review. A court should find an interim agency action ripe for review if
it commits the agency to a course of action which has environmental consequences.").
103. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash.
1992). Moseley was a sequel to Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081
(W.D. Wash. 1991). Id. at 1487. The plaintiffs were suing to challenge the Forest
Service's standards and guidelines to ensure the viability of the northern spotted owl
in national forests located in Forest Service Regions Five and Six. Id. In particular,
the plaintiffs alleged the Forest Service had failed to comply with NEPA. Id. The
court issued an injunction prohibiting the Forest Service from auctioning or award-
ing any additional timber sales that would log suitable habitat for the northern spot-
ted owl until the Forest Service complied with NEPA. Id. at 1493-94. The court
stated:
The harm will be done here if the Forest Service adopts an unlawful
regulation under which forest management plans are to be adopted and
logging rights sold. To postpone judicial review until specific timber
sales were designed to and about to be auctioned would defeat the inter-
ests not only of the plaintiffs but of the agency and the loggers as well.
Id. at 1488.
104. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 82 (2d ed. 1988).
105. R. PIERCE, JR. ET. AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS 203 (1985).
106. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1417 (10th Cir. 1990); Colorado Envtl.
Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 369 (D. Colo. 1992).
107. See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871,890-94 (1990)(holding
that there was no agency action for purposes of review although thousands of deci-
sions had been made under a "land withdrawal review program").
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(NWF), the Supreme Court declared that an agency must publish a
rule or regulation before the Court would declare an agency action
ripe.10 9 The rationale behind this formalistic approach is to pre-
serve the integrity of the administrative agency system by allowing
agencies to complete the decision-making process before being chal-
lenged.110 In addition, the Court urged in NWFlll that if the plain-
tiffs were truly being injured, they should look to other branches of
the government, specifically the legislature, to correct the wrong.
The Court stated that under the APA the judicial system was not
given the power to correct the administrative system unless there
was final agency action."X2 In its refusal to grant judicial review,
108. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
109. Id. at 890 n.2 (stating there must be a regulation which is final and applies
across the board.)
110. Abbott Lab. 387 U.S. at 148-49. The Court stated:
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine,
it is fair to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts' through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect
the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision
has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the chal-
lenging parties.
Id.
111. The plaintiffs in NWF challenged the Department of Interior, Bureau of
Land Management's (BLM) "land withdrawal review program," claiming it was in
violation of NEPA and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA). 497 U.S. at 875. The "land withdrawal review program" classified public
land, favoring a policy in favor of retaining public lands for multiple use manage-
ment. Id. at 876-77. In this process, plaintiffs alleged that some land would be
opened for mining activities, thus destroying the natural beauty of the public land.
Id. at 879. The plaintiffs alleged that the BLM focussed inordinately on mining ex-
ploitation and failed to notify the public of the BLM's decision. Id. Although the
BLM had made "1250 or so individual classification terminations and withdrawal
revocations," the court found that the program did not entail "agency action" within
the meaning of the APA. Id. at 890 (citing the district court, National Wildlife Feder-
ation v. Buford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). While the Court based its
decision on standing, the Court also concluded that there was no "final agency
action":
The term "land withdrawal review program" . .. does not refer to a sin-
gle BLM order or regulations, or even to a completed universe of partic-
ular BLM orders and regulations. It is simply the name by which [BLM
has] occasionally referred to the continuing (and thus constantly chang-
ing) operations of the BLM in reviewing withdrawal revocation applica-
tions and the classifications of the public lands and developing land use
plans as required by the FLMPA.
Id. Justice Blackmun in his dissent noted that the issue of ripeness was not briefed
or argued in this case. Furthermore, the Government made precisely the opposite
argument, asserting that the action was barred by laches. The Government con-
tended: "[Tihe [plaintiff] offers no explanation why, despite its detailed knowledge of
BLM's revocation and termination activities, it has waited so long to institute litiga-
tion." Id. at 915 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citing the Defendant's Memoran-
dum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction (August 22,
1985)).
112. Id. at 891.
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the Court ignored the other factors provided in Abbott Laborato-
ries.113 The Court did not examine the potential hardship on the
parties of withholding review and disregarding the potential envi-
ronmental effect of the agency action"14 at issue in NWF. The
Court, however, acknowledged that a case would be ripe if a plain-
tiff was required to immediately adjust his or her conduct due to a
substantive rule, regardless of whether statutory review was pro-
vided apart from the APA.n5
The Court admitted a "case-by-case approach . . . is under-
standably frustrating to an organization ... which has as its objec-
tive across-the-board protection of our Nation's wildlife and the
streams and forests that support it."116 Many federal courts, par-
ticularly in the West and in the Ninth Circuit, sympathize with this
frustration and use all the factors of Abbott Laboratories to analyze
if a case is ripe.li 7 These courts look pragmatically at the effect of
the agency action on the litigants and the hardship of delaying judi-
cial review. There is a possibility that if judicial review is withheld,
the case will become "moot" before becoming "ripe."118 The damage
to the environment will already have occurred before the agency
completes "final agency action."119
113. The Court did not consider (1) whether the issues were fit for judicial resolu-
tion, (2) the extent of the hardship on the parties from withholding judicial review,
or (3) whether there was "final agency action" in fact, if not in name. See, id. at 890-
94. See supra text accompanying note 88.
114. In approximately 1250 individual determinations, the BLM removed the wil-
derness protection on 180 million acres spread over seventeen states. National Wild-
life Fed. v. Buford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
115. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. at 891.
116. Id. at 894.
117. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1417 (10th Cir. 1992); Colo-
rado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 369 (D. Colo. 1992); Seattle Audu-
bon Soc. v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (W.D. Wash 1992). Although not a
NEPA case, recently the Seventh Circuit stated:
The ripeness doctrine requires a live, focused case of real consequence
to the parties. It does not require [the plaintiff] to jump through a se-
ries of hoops, the last of which it is certain to find obstructed by a brick
wall.
Triple G Landfills, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs. of Fountain County, 977 F.2d 287, 291
(7th Cir. 1992)(invalidating a county ordinance that precluded the plaintiffs from
developing a landfill).
118. The plaintiffs in Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representatives, 970
F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992) claimed that their "NEPA claim might become moot before
it ripened because courts would refuse to enjoin lawfully approved international
agreements on the basis of NEPA violations." Id. at 921-22. The court disagreed,
stating that there is a chance that Congress could change the existing rules and laws
that would force a situation where a court would be prevented engaging in any
meaningful review in time. Id.
119. In NWF, over 180 million acres of wilderness were reclassified, removing the
protections provided by a "wilderness" classification. Although the Court found that
there was no "final agency action," Justice Blackmun stated: "Abundant record evi-
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Furthermore, even before there has been "final agency action,"
the legal wrong may have already occurred in NEPA cases. NEPA
creates informational rights and participation rights.120 Specifi-
cally, NEPA allows the public to receive information about govern-
ment activity and to challenge agency determinations.121 Many
times, the EIS is a vital source of public information concerning an
agency action that may affect the environment.122 This informa-
tion is the best ammunition the public has to challenge agency deci-
sions. 123 The public comment and participation process is the only
time to challenge an agency decision before the action permanently
destroys the environment.' 24 If NEPA is not followed and the pub-
lic is deprived of information and the right to participate, there has
dence supported the [plaintiffs] assertion that on lands newly opened for mining,
mining in fact would occur... [and that] mining activities can be expected to cause
severe environmental damage." 497 U.S. at 915 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
supra note 101 for a discussion of Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (1992); Sierra Club v. Hodel,
848 F.2d 1068, 1093-94 (10th Cir. 1988). See supra note 30 and accompanying text
(1988).
121. 42 U.S.C. §.4332(2) (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.19, 1506.6 (1992).
122. See Brief, supra note 7 (declaration of Cynthia Shogan, at 3-4). ("As the leg-
islative process proceeds ... I will be called upon to give detailed information to
members of Congress and their staffs about the Secretary's rationale for dropping
Turtle Canyon and the public reaction to it. I will need to be able to present the
technical basis for our rebuttal of the Secretary's decision and to explain whether the
Secretary has any viable support for his decision in light of our rebuttal.... For
example, I might refer to the comments of mining companies to inform members of
Congress or their staffs about the presence or absence of conflicts with that use in a
given area. In the case of the decision to drop Turtle Canyon, the Secretary made
the decision without preparing a Supplemental EIS and without public comment or
hearing, and I am unable to present either the mining industry's viewpoint or the
agency's response to our scientific rebuttal of the Secretary's rationale for the deci-
sion .to drop. There is no alternative source for this type of information.... In my
experience, it is far easier and more efficient to obtain and organize such information
in the actual EIS ... process than to do so later, in the turmoil of the final legislative
process."); Brief, supra note 7 (declaration of Andrew Wiessner, at 2) (Counsel to the
Public Land Subcommittee of the Interior Committee of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives from 1977 to 1985)("The [EIS] serve[s] as a baseline source of data about
the areas, their attributes, and the possible resource conflicts. They also contain[ I
comments from the public, government agencies, affected industries and others on
the proposed wilderness designation, and the agency's responses to those comments.
It [is] also very important to have written information as to why the Administrative
Branch or the land managing agency.., decided to recommend or not recommend an
area for wilderness and to have their official written reasons for making the decision.
I frequently refer to the data, comments and responses to ascertain some of the im-
portant basic facts necessary to advise the [Public Lands Subcommittee of the Inte-
rior Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives] and to draft legislation. There
[is] no other single source of the type of information contained in the [EIS]. While
not an exhaustive source, the [EIS is] a valuable tool to me, to other staff members,
and to the Representatives themselves in the legislative process.").
123. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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already been a legal wrong, regardless of whether there has been
final agency action.125
Part II: Current Ripeness Doctrine and NEPA
Because NWF, the most recent Supreme Court case on ripe-
ness and NEPA, was mainly a standing case, the application of the
ripeness doctrine in environmental cases is still far from clear. De-
spite the Supreme Court's rigid application of the ripeness doc-
trine,126 some federal courts have been returning to the traditional,
more flexible approach.127 With some courts following NWF and
others citing Abbott Laboratories, the ripeness doctrine is currently
more confused than ever. For example, a case that may be "unripe"
in the D.C. Circuit may be ripe in the Ninth Circuit.
Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tives 12s (Public Citizen) and Colorado Environmental Coalition v.
Lujan129 (CEC) exemplify the different treatment ripeness inquir-
ies are currently receiving.
Public Citizen took a very formalistic approach to the ripeness
doctrine. The plaintiff in this case, Public Citizen,' 30 sued the
United States Trade Representative negotiating both the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs (GATT) and the North
America Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA)
for failing to prepare an EIS as required by section 102(c) of
NEPA.131 The D.C. Circuit Court did not reach the merits of the
case. 132 Despite the fact that the Trade Representative had refused
a request to prepare an EIS,133 the court dismissed the case be-
cause it could not identify any "final agency action."134 In so ruling,
125. In City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 492
(D.C. Cir. 1990), the court stated:
The procedural and informational thrust of NEPA gives rise to a cogni-
zable injury from denial of its explanatory process, so long as there is a
reasonable risk that environmental harm may occur.
126. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 890-94 (1990).
127. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1417, (10th Cir. 1990); Colorado
Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 369 (D. Colo. 1992); Seattle Audubon
Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (W.D. Wash 1992).
128. 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
129. 803 F. Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992).
130. Public Citizen is a nonprofit legal watchdog group.
131. Public Citizen, 970 F.2d at 917.
132. The District Court failed to reach the merits of the case as well. The case
was dismissed on summary judgement because the plaintiffs lacked standing. Pub-
lic Citizen v. USTR, 782 F. Supp. 139, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
133. Public Citizen, 970 F.2d at 918. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng,
943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1991) held that refusal to prepare an EIS is not final
agency action.
134. Public Citizen, 970 F.2d at 917.
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the D.C. Circuit failed to recognize that failing to prepare an EIS at
that stage of the negotiations most likely would preclude any deci-
sion to prepare an EIS at all. The trade treaties at issue are under
a "fast track statute, 13 5 which forces Congress to approve or reject
the treaty within 60 days.13 6 Although Congress does have the
power to extend this time period,137 as the law stands, there would
be no time to prepare an EIS, and thus the environmental impact of
these treaties would not be considered.
The court dismissed the other factors of the ripeness test, i.e.,
whether the issues were purely legal and whether there would be
hardship on the plaintiffs, as irrelevant to the inquiry into the re-
quirement of final agency action.138 The court claimed that final
agency action is an independent jurisdictional requirement. 139 The
court completely ignored the practical effect of the Trade Represen-
tative's140 decision: the treaties would be presented to Congress
without any consideration of the impact the treaties would have on
the environment.
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit Court, a district court in Colo-
rado, a little more than one month after the Public Citizen decision,
did consider the practical effect of an agency decision in Colorado
Environmental Coalition v. Lujan, (CEC). 14 1 The Colorado Envi-
ronmental Coalition, the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, and
the Wilderness Society142 sued the Secretary of the Interior for fail-
ing to prepare a supplemental EIS, claiming that their information
and participation rights had been violated. 143 Specifically, the
plaintiffs claimed that they could not challenge the Secretary's as-
signment of unusually high mining values to five wilderness areas
in Colorado and Utah and his decision to drop the wilderness pro-
tection from those areas.14 4 The court held that the Secretary of
the Interior's refusal to prepare such a supplemental EIS was suffi-
cient to constitute "final agency action."'14 5 In CEC, the court de-
135. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(1988).
136. Id. § 2191(c) & (e).
137. Id. § 2191(a).
138. Public Citizen, 970 F.2d at 921-22.
139. Id. at 921.
140. The court did not reach the question of whether the United States Trade
Representative was an agency within the definition of the APA. Id. at 917-18.
141. Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 369-70 (D. Colo. 1992)
(CEC).
142. The plaintiffs are all non-profit corporations from Colorado, Utah, and the
District of Columbia dedicated to wilderness protection in Colorado, Utah, and Ne-
vada. Id. at 367.
143. Id. at 367-69.
144. Id. at 368-69; Brief, supra note 7, at 2-5, 17-22.
145. CEC, 803 F. Supp. at 369.
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fined final agency action as "when it was definitive rather than
tentative, when it has a direct and immediate effect on the day-to-
day business of the parties, and when it has the status of law and
requires immediate compliance." 146 The court declared that the
Secretary's refusal to prepare a supplemental EIS already had a
"direct and immediate effect on the day-to-day business of the par-
ties"147 because their information and participation rights had been
violated. In addition, the court noted the practical effect of the Sec-
retary's decision:
[T]he Secretary has reached an irreversible decision. Once the
recommendations are sent to the President based on inade-
quate procedures in violation of NEPA, there will be no oppor-
tunity for any other recommendations by the Secretary as to
the wilderness study areas in question. Therefore, the court
concludes that the question presented is legal in nature and
that the challenged agency action is final. 148
Both Public Citizen and CEC focused on a decision not to con-
sider the environmental impact of the agency's recommendations.
The CEC court looked at the practical effect of such a decision, real-
izing that the decision at issue was in violation of NEPA, while the
Public Citizen court only focused on what the Trade Representative
herself labeled the decision - not final. The practical result of the
Trade Representative's decision was that the environmental impact
of the treaties would not be considered when they were presented to
Congress.
Part M: The Pragmatic Approach is More Sensible
Considering the legislative histories of the APA and NEPA,
precedent, and the nature of agency decisions, the pragmatic ap-
proach of CEC is the more proper approach.
The APA's legislative history proves Congress intended to
grant to the courts wide powers to review agency decisions.149
Agency decisions, if they affect peoples' rights, should not be insu-
lated from judicial review. There must be some vehicle to redress a
legal wrong, such as a violation of NEPA which results in the denial
of notification and participation in a government decision that will
adversely affect the environment. While the courts should be con-
cerned about interrupting the decision-making process, there is no
reason why the courts should allow agencies to systematically avoid
146. Id. (citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151-52 (1967)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See discussion supra introduction; Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 140-
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the NEPA process. The NEPA process triggers the public's right to
participate in and contribute to a decision which may affect them.
By not allowing the legal rights to trigger, the courts are denying
the legal rights absolutely.150
A person is deprived of the NEPA right to be notified and par-
ticipate when an agency that is planning to engage in a "major fed-
eral action" or preparing a proposal to Congress for legislation
decides not to comply with NEPA and decides not to prepare an
EIS. An agency may claim that the action at issue is exempted
from the NEPA requirements because there is no "final agency ac-
tion" at the current time. This, however, misses the point: the legal
wrong occurs when an agency decides not to prepare an EIS and
denies the public its information and participation rights. These
rights are vitally important to the public because they enable peo-
ple to participate in the democratic process of governing and also to
protect themselves from government action that is detrimental to
their environment.
In CEC, the Secretary of Interior prevented the plaintiffs from
challenging the agency's determination that five wilderness areas
had high mining values.151 The Secretary formally recommended
to the President that these areas not be protected permanently as
wilderness areas because of the areas' alleged mining potential.152
The Secretary made this determination immediately before sending
his recommendations to the President.'5 3 Importantly, the Secre-
tary did not file an EIS or hold public hearings, thereby failing to
comply with NEPA requirements. As a result, the public was de-
nied an opportunity to participate in the wilderness designation
process. 154
150. Justice Harlan stated that "judicial review of a final agency action by an ag-
grieved person will not be cut off unless there is a persuasive reason to believe that
such was the purpose of Congress." Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 140.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 141-144.
152. Brief, supra note 7, at 2-5, 29.
153. Id.
154. James Gehres, who was denied the right to participate in public hearings
because the Secretary refused to complete a Supplementary Environmental Impact
Statement concerning the five wilderness areas at issue in CEC, stated:
I would like for Secretary Lujan to issue a Supplementary Environmen-
tal Impact Statement on his decision to drop these areas from his wil-
derness recommendation so that I can make formal comments and
participate in any public hearing on the subject. In my comments, I
would describe the spectacular beauty of these two wilderness study
areas and their value as recreational areas. Also, I would report that I
have seen no indication of current mining activity. Nor have I seen any
indication of new stakes in the wilderness study areas. The only evi-
dence of mining interest in the areas that I have observed is a narrow
crude road which was built approximately four year ago up Silver
Creek Canyon, but that road has since been abandoned. I would report
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Furthermore, information was kept from people who needed it
for the legislative process. 155 The EIS is the best source of informa-
tion for Congress to use in evaluating an agency action, because
EIS reports are required to be comprehensive and probative.' 56 In
CEC, the EIS reports would have contained information concerning
the areas' attributes, other resources available to the areas other
than wilderness, public comments including declarations from peo-
ple who use the wilderness areas on a regular basis, 157 government
comments, agency comments, industry comments, and agency re-
sponses to those comments. This information is vital to a complete
balancing of all the competing interests so that a decision can be
made concerning the full impact of an agency activity, examining
the most efficient use of environmental resources whether they be
mining or recreational, conservation or preservation.15 8
It is clear that NEPA was intended to lessen the environmen-
tal impact of federal actions through procedural requirements.15 9
Yet, agencies can insulate their activities from judicial review by
claiming that they have not yet reached a stage when the EIS pro-
cess is necessary. Agencies may then claim that their decisions are
a part of an ongoing "process" which should not be reviewed until
its completion. Because of the irreparable nature of environmental
injuries, however, agency manipulation of the NEPA process is un-
conscionable. One court, which recently issued an injunction
prohibiting the Forest Service from auctioning or awarding logging
rights in areas which would harm the spotted owl stated:
Environmental injury, by its very nature, can seldom be ade-
quately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or
at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If such injury is suffi-
my conclusion that there is no visible interest in the area by modern
mineral developers. I do not believe that developers would ignore these
areas if they were as rich in minerals as the [Secretary's] dollar-value
assessment claims.
Brief, supra note 7, Declaration of James Gehres, at 6. Mr. Gehres visits the areas
at issue annually and had planned a return visit to the area at the time of litigation.
Mr. Gehres had also participated in public hearings in 1982 concerning the wilder-
ness study areas. Id.
155. Brief, supra note 7, at 4-5.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b), 1502.1, 1506.8 (1992).
157. The EIS is an important vehicle for those that use wilderness areas on a
regular basis to voice their views. Wilderness recreational use is an important eco-
nomic consideration that may outweigh mining value, particularly if the mineral is
of poor quality. See, e.g., supra note 154.
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502, 1506.8 (1992); Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
159. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d at 1112-
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ciently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor
the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.1 60
To deny judicial consideration because of agency manipulation is
contrary to the purpose of NEPA.
Judicial precedent supports the position that courts should
look at the practical effect of agency decisions on litigants161 rather
than the labels the agencies give to their actions. If the courts look
only at the labels of the decisions, agencies are given the power to
declare when their determinations are "final," and, thus, agencies
are given the power to control when their decisions receive judicial
review.1 62 The labels agencies give to their decisions - either final
or not final - ignores the true impact of the legal wrongs those
decisions have on litigants.
Furthermore, in some cases, denying judicial review may not
be the best use of judicial resources. If it is clear that litigants' legal
rights are being injured by an agency action, it would be in the best
interest of all the parties involved to solve the dispute rather than
deny review. 16 3 Resolving disputes early may also save judicial re-
sources, e.g., some cases have been litigated repeatedly because of
court's denial of review.16 4
Courts should consider the true impact of an agency action on
the plaintiffs rather than apply a formalistic test to determine if the
issues are ripe. Under the formalistic approach, the agencies have
the power to insulate their activities from judicial review simply by
claiming that there has been no final agency action, regardless of
160. Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (W.D. Wash.
1992) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)).
161. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911
F.2d 1405, 1417 (10th Cir. 1992); Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp.
364, 369 (D. Colo. 1992); Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1488
(W.D. Wash. 1992).
162. See supra note 20 (discussing the trend of agencies towards more "informal"
decision-making processes).
163. Furthermore, the CEQ regulations explicitly state that the NEPA process
should be implemented early, as it will only be effective if the environmental impact
of an agency action will be considered concurrently with the main agency proposal:
Agencies shall integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the
earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect envi-
ronmental values, to avoid delays later in the process, and to head off
potential conflicts.
40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (1992).
164. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sullivan v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1992)(involv-
ing the exchange of a conservation easement located in the Grand National Park for
federal coal). This case has been litigated since 1986, Ash Creek Min. Co. v. Lujan,
934 F.2d 240, 241 (10th Cir. 1991), and has spawned no less than three cases that
went to the Circuit level: Ash Creek Min. Co. 969 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992); State ex
rel. Sullivan v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1992); Ash Creek Min. Co. v. Lujan,
934 F.2d 240, 241 (10th Cir. 1991).
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the true impact of their decisions. The more flexible approach to
the ripeness question penetrates the labels and scrutinizes the true,
legal impact of an agency decision.
Conclusion
The court system is designed to protect rights that are being
violated by invidious application of law.165 Judicial review is an
integral part of the legal system that protects rights. A presump-
tion of judicial review was granted in Marbury v. Madison. 166 This
presumption should not be eliminated because administrative
agencies desire to govern without impediment.
An agency decision should not be deemed "not final" because
an agency states it is not final.167 The real impact of such a deci-
sion must be examined to determine if the decision affects rights
granted by NEPA. A court should delve into whether the issues can
be decided by a court and into the true impact of withholding judi-
cial review. Formalistic approaches ignore such impacts. Func-
tional, pragmatic approaches do not.
Author's Postscript
Public Citizen filed another action against the Office of Trade
Representative (OTR), again trying to compel the OTR to complete
165. Alexander Hamilton affirmed this principle:
[The] independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Con-
stitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves,
and which, though they speedily give place to better information and
more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occa-
sion dangerous innovations in the government and serious oppression
of the minor party in the community... the independence of the judges
may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill
humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the
injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens by unjust
and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of
vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation
of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of
those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the
legislative body in passing them ... Considerate men of every descrip-
tion ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify [the independ-
ent] temper in the courts, as no man can be sure that he may not be
tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice by which he may be a gainer
today.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 173-75 (Alexander Hamilton)(Ralph H. Gabriel ed.,
1954).
166. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
167. What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other word would smell as sweet.
WILLIAM SHAKEsPEARE, RoMEo AND JULmT, act 2, sc. 2.
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an EIS on the NAFTA treaty.168 The D.C. Circuit held in Public
Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representatives (Public
Citizen 1)169 (the first round of litigation discussed in the article)
that the OTR had not completed its negotiating process, and there-
fore the action was not ripe for judicial review. Once the OTR was
finished negotiating NAFTA and had finalized the treaty, Public
Citizen filed another action, Public Citizen II, claiming that there
was not a "final agency action" to trigger the NEPA require-
ments.170 Furthermore, NAFTA will be submitted to Congress
under the "fast track" statute,17 1 precluding any changes to
NAFTA.172
However, once again the D.C. Circuit held that the issues were
not ripe for review because there was no identifiable "final agency
action."173 The court held that there would be "final agency action"
when President Clinton submitted NAFTA to Congress, which he
has not yet done. 17 4 However, NAFTA is scheduled to take effect
January 1, 1994, leaving insufficient time to complete the EIS pro-
cess. 175 Even the court's concurring opinion recognized that the
court's holding was inconsistent with past precedent and frustrated
NEPA's objectives:
The nub of the problem is that judicial review under the APA
demands "final agency action" whereas the duty to prepare an
impact statement arises earlier. The main objective of an im-
pact statement is to ensure that the decisionmaker considers
environmental effects prior to taking action. This is why in
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 n.15, 96 S.Ct. 2718,
2728 n.15, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976), the Court - without men-
tioning § 704 [the final agency action requirement] of the APA
- identified the "time at which a court enters the process" to be
"when the report or recommendation on the proposal is made,
and someone protests either the absence or the adequacy of the
final impact statement." [The court's holding], 176 as applied to
NEPA suits may have to be reconciled with the portion of
Kleppe v. Sierra Club just quoted.
Public Citizen filed a petition for certiorari on October 8, 1993.177
168. Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative (Public
Citizen II), - F.3d __, 1993 WL 371802 (D.C. Cir.).
169. 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
170. Public Citizen 11, 1993 WL at *1.
171. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2194, 2902-2903.




176. The D.C. Circuit based its decision on Franklin v. Massachusetts, - U.S. -,
112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), a case that did not deal with NEPA or the
environment, but with census data collection.
177. 62 USLW 3289.
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